Report of the Board of Inquiry to Ascertain Lapses if any, by the Armed Forces and State Intelligence Services During the Recent Incidents of Violence

 Report of the Board of Inquiry to Ascertain Lapses if any, by the Armed Forces and State Intelligence Services During the Recent Incidents of Violence

DELIBERATIONS
1.The Board of Inquiry commenced its activities on 27.05.2022, at the 11th Floc of the Western Provincial Council Secretariat. A total of 65 witnesses wer summoned before the Board1 and evidence was recorded. All documents necessar for identifying the ground deployments were obtained from the Armed Force Additionally, documents required to study action plans of the Police were als obtain
OBSERVATIONS
1.Due to the current economic situation in the country, many protests we recorded, of which, details are shown in Annex A.
2. The protest led by Hirunika Premachandra at Pangiriwatta Road, Mirhana o 5th March 2022 had taken the HE's security detail totally by surprise.
3.The following day many discussions had been held including some chaired by the Secretary Defence to work out contingency plans in order to prevent such situations in the future.
4.However, the contingency plans prepared were not properly executed due to delays in deployment of troops at Mirihana.
5. The mob activity at Mirihana had not been detected by any Intelligence agency although the peaceful protest that preceded it was known.
6. On instructions of the Secretary of Defence, the Air Force and the Navy had reacted promptly and arrived at the location on time. However, it was observed that the Army had delayed in deploying their troops, which resulted in their inability to reach the required location on time due to the increasing numbers of protesters blocking the road. As a result of this, the Old Kesbewa road had been totally blocked by protesters from the directions of Mirihana and Ambuldeniya.
7.Secretary of Defence, Secretary of Public Security, CDS, three Service Commanders with the IGP had rushed to the Army operations room at Akuregoda, to monitor, coordinate and direct operations.
8.The mob violence escalated to a point where damage to public property took place in the form of burning of a CTB bus, damaging walls and houses in the vicinity of the private residence of HE the President.
9.At approximately 0100 hrs on the 01st of April 2022, the STF supported by the Air Force had baton charged the violent mob and chased them towards the Ambuldeniya junction.
10.The situation had been brought under control by 0200 hours on 1st of April 2022.
11.The lack of professionalism leading to indecisive action displayed in handling the Mirihana situation had given confidence for mobsters to carry out a series of similar activities in other parts of the country thereafter.
12.On 5th of April 2022, instructions had gone from Army Headquarters to all Field Commanders to carry out reconnaissance of VIP residences and record the distances from the nearest Army camp in order to rush troops if the requirement
arose.
13. The contingency plan involving the Army and Police carried out on the 5th of April in respect of protecting the residence of Hon. Kanchana Wijesekara was satisfactorily rehearsed according to available intelligence of a possible attack on the house of the Hon. Minister.
14.On the 9th of May 2022, Hon. Kanchana Wijesekara's house was attacked after the road block manned by the Police and the Army was breached by the mobsters. Police who had been inside the house had fired tear gas and warning shots and had taken the parents of the Minister to safety in a Police Jeep, after which, another Army Unit with the Brigade Commander himself arrived at the location to consolidate.
15.Field Commanders had been informed by the Army Commander not to deploy troops until he personally gives the order to do so. Field Commanders should have been given the orders to deploy troops depending on the necessity of the developing situation on the ground, in coordination with the Police in the area, as emergency had already been declared by this time.
16.The orders given to deploy the Army between the time period 1830-1845 hrs had resulted in valuable time lost in providing assistance to the Police in order to prevent damage and arson to properties of politicians.
17. Although more than 250 Army personnel had been deployed in Anuradhapura to protect Gnana Maniyo's house, they were unable to take suitable action to prevent the damage and arson.
18. Army troops have withdrawn from the location where Hon. Channa Jayasumane's office was in Anuradhapura about 45 minutes prior to the arrival of the mob which set fire to the house, citing that the Police had not arrived at the
roadblock as agreed.
19. The Board observes that the Army had not used minimum force required at most of the locations where they were deployed causing the violent mob to take the upper hand and initiative that resulted in arson and destruction to houses/property.
20.At the Temple Trees premises, the Navy and the Air Force had gone to the extent of firing warning shots to disperse the protesters whenever their behavior became violent. This was done after the Commanders of these two Services gave direct orders to the troops under their command.
21.Due to the increase in mob activity with violence in areas of Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa and Colombo, a large number of Army troops exceeding 4,500 personnel which included five Battalions of the elite Air Mobile Brigade as well as the Special Forces and Commandos had been brought down to Colombo to enhance
security.
22. Emergency had been declared on 6th May 2022 due to increased mob violence in many parts of the country.
23. The Actg. CDS / Army Commander had issued two sets of instructions contradicting each other2.
24. The Actg. CDS/ Army Commander has disregarded the direct orders of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, HE the President and also the Secretary of Defence to take meaningful action in quelling the mob violence.
25. The three services are not properly equipped and trained for Riot Control duties. They need to be provided with appropriate equipment including communication sets to quell mob violence. Please see Annexes B and C
26. In spite of clear written instructions issued by the MOD, the Actg. CDS/Army Commander had disregarded those instructions and given an interview to a leading national newspaper.
27. The interview given by the Actg. CDS/Army Commander to a national newspaper regarding the incidents of 09th of May 2022 at Temple Trees while the BOI proceedings were taking place could be viewed as an attempt to undermine /influence the BOI proceedings.
28.The answers to the questions raised by the Board from the three Senior Officers of Air Mobile Brigade deployed in Colombo on 9th of May 2022, who gave evidence at the BOI, were influenced by it because their evidence supported the ideas given by Gen. Shavendra Silva at his interview with 'Aruna' newspaper on 29th of May 2022.
29. The Secretary of Defence has not taken any action to inform the three Service Commanders of the intelligence report delivered to his residence on Sunday the 8th and the WhatsApp message on the same intelligence at 0615 hrs on Monday the 09th of May by the Director SIS, with regard to possible clashes/violence at Galle Face on 9th May3.
30. The IGP had been given a copy of the same INT report on which he has taken action by informing SDIG Deshabandu Tennakoon in writing to take appropriate action4.
31.The Armed Forces were called to maintain law & order under the Public Seurity Ordnance at the time the incident on the 09th of May 2022 was taking place. Additionally, a state of emergency was also declared on the 06th of May 2022, empowering the Security Forces further.
32.About 60% of all serving Armed Forces personnel had joined after conclusion of the humanitarian operation in May 2009. Notable JVP infiltration is observed during this period.
33. Service recruitments take place before security clearance of selected candidates are obtained.
34. Over 100 lawyers appearing for the rioters after the Rambukkana shooting incident and Mirihana mob violence has demoralized the Military and the Police to 3 Please see Annex D 4 Please see Annex E .such an extent that there was reluctance on their part to apply minimum force as necessary to quell the violence. The ongoing legal proceedings after the Rathupaswala incident and the military officers concerned having to appear before the Courts even after their retirement had added more uncertainty to this issue.
35. Live telecasts of the incidents at Mirihana, Galle Face and Temple Trees in Social media platforms as well as some of the mainstream media platforms acted as an incentive for the public to take part in violent mob activity.
36. Secretary of Defence and CNI stated under oath that they did not receive the INT report about the possible clash between supporters of the Hon. Prime Minister and protesters at Galle Face on 9th, in writing on Sunday the 8th evening delivered to their respective residences at 17.00 hrs, and by WhatsApp message on 9th morning at 06.15 hrs. This stance contradicts with the evidence recorded from Director SIS and verified through the action taken by the IGP on receipt of such intelligence
report.
37.The General Officer Commanding of the 53 Division stated that he was 'ashamed' to have come in front of this Presidential Board of Inquiry. The officer's conduct was reported to the Army Commander for action deemed fit.
38. A well-coordinated contingency plan was not in place to deal with the situation at HE the President's private residence in spite of serious agitations against him and also to deal with other situations that occurred throughout the country. There had not been a proper command structure in place to command and
39. coordinate HE the President's security at Mirihana to deal with the situation that occurred on 31st March 2022.
40.The BOI notes that there was no proper analysis done on the security situation in spite of the unusual number of incidents that took place in the country.
41. A well-coordinated intelligence and operational contingency plan was lacking at all levels.
42. Commanders at all levels were totally surprised by the well-coordinated countrywide mob reaction as a sequel to the incidents at Galle face and Temple Trees. Therefore, action of the Security Forces and Police had been very slow and reactive.
43.Director in charge of security at PMSD should always be a carefully selected, well qualified and experienced senior officer who could command the respect of all troops assigned for such duties.
44.The rank and file within Temple Trees premises had fought with commitment until reinforcements arrived and evacuated the PM and the family to safety.
45.In general, it is observed that the protesters achieved their objective due to the lack of effective counter measures.
46. The Board observes that media must play a responsible role when dealing with matters threatening national security.
47.The Board observes that the main reason for agitations to gain momentum in anti-government protests which turned into country-wide violence is due to the general belief of widespread corruption and misuse of public funds.
48.The Board observes that the cooperation and coordination that existed between the Armed Services and the Police in the past has gradually eroded to a point where the Services and the Police are acting independently of each other.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the above observations, the Board has arrived at the following conclusions:
1.Actg. CDS/Commander
The orders and instructions given by the Commander in Chief and subsequent supporting orders given by the Secretary of Defense had not been conveyed by the of the Army General Shavendra Silva to the Field Commanders on time. Furthermore, no clear instructions had been issued with regard to action to be taken to quell mob violence, which amounts to willful neglect
of duty. As a result, the troops on ground could not prevent the damage to public property and harm to persons.
2. The delay indicated at paragraph (1) under Conclusion above precipitated a serious situation at Temple Trees, particularly to the lives of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, his family, as well as a number of Cabinet and State Ministers who were trapped at Temple Trees premises and also to the large number of people who had come to bid farewell to the Prime Minister.
 Please see Annex A